


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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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SYRIA-ISRAEL: Lebanese President Frangie has persuaded President Asad to remove Syrian surface-to-air missile batteries from Lebanese territory near Mount Hermon [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Syrians had agreed to their removal because Damascus believes a disengagement agreement will be reached, and because the missiles provided only minimal protection against Israeli aircraft overflying Lebanon en route to Syrian targets. [REDACTED] Israeli air strikes against these batteries may have also been a factor in the Syrian withdrawal.

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Military action on the Golan front was light yesterday. Artillery fire was reported east of Al Qunaytirah and on Mount Hermon. Israeli aircraft again struck at fedaveen positions in southern Lebanon

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PORTUGUESE AFRICA: A spokesman for the Portuguese military junta yesterday described as "constructive" an offer for negotiations announced Monday by the Portuguese Guinea insurgent movement.

It seems certain, however, that the new provisional government, which will be announced this week, will have difficulty accepting the conditions attached to the rebel proposal. The offer included the condition that Lisbon recognize the "right of independence" for the "State of Guinea-Bissau," proclaimed by the insurgents last fall, as well as for the peoples of Angola and Mozambique. Despite the inclusion of Angola and Mozambique in their offer--probably made out of a feeling of brotherhood--the rebels will probably be willing eventually to negotiate strictly for themselves if Lisbon shows interest in their offer.

Heretofore, the ruling junta in Lisbon has offered the insurgents an equal chance with newly emerging political organizations within the territories to determine the future of the territories. Lisbon has recognized the territories' right to self-determination, acknowledging the risk of eventual independence, but it hopes for a close federation with the territories, particularly Angola and Mozambique.

Lisbon probably will make its response applicable only to Portuguese Guinea, where its economic and political interests are negligible. It prefers to deal with the insurgencies in the three territories separately and on the basis of the different military and political situations in each. The insurgent organizations in Angola and Mozambique do not have the political position of the insurgents in Portuguese Guinea, and the insurgents in Angola do not have the military strength of their counterparts in Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea.

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Meanwhile, the Portuguese are transferring additional troops in Angola to the northern part of the territory, according to an official announcement from Lisbon. The Portuguese Government apparently fears that the insurgents may launch more aggressive military operations in the area. Lisbon may also be attempting to reassure white Angolans that it will continue to defend the territory.

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ARGENTINA: Wholesale resignations from the top ranks of the federal police are likely to limit even further the government's counterterrorism programs. Seven police commissioners have resigned and 21 subordinate officers are planning to do likewise because of several controversial appointments to the leadership of the 18,000-man force. President Peron recently named two of his old-line rightist supporters, former police officials Alberto Villar and Luis Magaride, as chief and deputy chief respectively.

Villar is an expert on terrorism and appears to be reasonably well-qualified for the job. Magaride, on the other hand, is known mainly for his role as captain of the police morality squad during the military government. He reportedly was sacked after his over-zealous men arrested several government officials. This, in addition to the fact that both have been brought out of retirement in contravention of police regulations, apparently sparked the resignations. Moreover, Peron's private secretary and minister of social welfare, Lopez Rega, a retired federal policeman, has been promoted from corporal to commissioner--a jump of 15 ranks. Although he has not been returned to active duty, the move brought protests from the Senate and will further undermine the morale of the police.

The effectiveness of the federal police, who are charged with maintaining internal security, has long been affected by frequent turnovers in key personnel and bureaucratic inertia. The resignation of so many senior officers is likely to cause further delays in Peron's plans for a major showdown with the terrorists.

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SOUTH VIETNAM - THAILAND: President Thieu has ordered government officials to take immediate steps to damp down a potentially serious dispute over fishing limits between the two countries.

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The long-standing dispute was sharpened on April 23 when a South Vietnamese patrol boat opened fire on a Thai fishing vessel operating within South Vietnam's self-declared 50-mile fishing limit, killing the ship's captain. A few days later, the South Vietnamese arrested 13 Thai fishermen and impounded their vessel. The incidents prompted a sharp protest from the Thai Government. Bangkok said it would no longer recognize the 50-mile limit and hinted that in the future Thai vessels might be protected by armed naval escorts. The Thai Government, however, moved quickly to keep the issue from escalating by stating that negotiation, rather than confrontation, was the only proper means of solving the problem.

Saigon's effort to defuse the matter should in large measure assuage Bangkok's bruised feelings and calm emotions that are currently running high in the Bangkok press.

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CYPRUS: Tensions have increased between the Makarios government and the Greek-officered national guard following the theft last week of light weapons from a national guard armory. The arms probably are intended for the hard-line remnants of EOKA-B, the pro-union with Greece organization led by General George Grivas until his death last January. The theft is reportedly the largest of several made from national guard stores this year.

The mainland Greek officers were originally sent to Cyprus to train the national guard and help defend the Greek Cypriot community, but they have also served as a means for Athens to maintain its influence on Cypriot affairs. President Makarios has sought to lessen this influence and increase his independence by creating the tactical reserve unit, a force of about 600 native Greek Cypriots loyal to him. He would like to expand this force into a full-fledged Greek Cypriot army to replace the suspect national guard.

Relations between Makarios and the Greek mainland officers have worsened since the coup in Greece on November 25. The use of these officers by Athens to help sustain the remnants of EOKA-B since the death of Grivas in January has further aggravated these relations.

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Makarios may use the latest arms theft as a pretext to impose further restrictions on national guard activity. He may also demand the recall of some Greek mainland officers as he has done in the past. Further efforts to restrict the national guard could cause a serious new confrontation with the Athens government.

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CSCE - WESTERN EUROPE: The NATO allies have confirmed their pessimistic view of the progress of the European security conference by deciding to make no commitments now on the timing and level of the conference's final stage.

NATO's Senior Political Committee has turned down a staff proposal that studies be carried out in preparation for a discussion of the level and timing of the security conference's final stage at the NATO ministerial meeting on June 18 and 19 in Ottawa. Instead, the allies agreed that they should undertake an analysis of conference accomplishments so far and a definition of conference outcomes that might justify moving to a final stage.

The allies are reacting to the intransigence the Soviets have shown since the conference resumed in Geneva on April 22 on the issue of freer movement of people and ideas. Despite reports that the Soviets had decided to cooperate on this matter in order to move the conference along toward a summit-level conclusion this summer, they have so far shown no flexibility on substance.

Even if the final conference results do not completely satisfy the allies, many Western governments may find the prospect of a summit appealing. As the Canadian representative noted in the political committee, many new heads of government would welcome the publicity a summit would give them.

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FRANCE: Neither of the French presidential candidates appears likely to make large-scale changes in the country's defense policies, and the differences between them on defense matters seem to be more stylistic than substantive.

Both Mitterrand and Giscard d'Estaing have avoided detailed comments on defense policies because they apparently see little gain for France from making substantial alterations and they are facing an electorate satisfied with current policies. Both contenders have been concentrating on domestic issues on which the electorate is calling for change and improvement.

Many of the main tenets of French defense policy predate the Fifth Republic and have roots in basic French attitudes, and they are likely to prevail regardless of which candidate wins:

--France will not reintegrate its forces into NATO if Giscard is elected nor will it withdraw any further if Mitterrand wins.

--Independence will continue to be the cornerstone of French defense policy.

--Development and expansion of the nuclear Force de Dissuasion will continue.

French receptivity to European defense cooperation is unlikely to be any greater, particularly where French sovereignty might be adversely affected.

France's European partners as well as the US would probably find a Giscard presidency less abrasive than those of his predecessors or one run by Mitterrand. Giscard may be under pressure from his centrist backers to work more harmoniously with other NATO countries. On the other hand, if he wins, he will also be obligated to the Gaullists and will probably be under counterpressure not to change much more than style.

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Like Giscard d'Estaing, Mitterrand has generally soft-pedaled defense issues. In Mitterrand's case, however, this is partly because of his alliance with the French Communist Party. The Socialists and the Communists have not hammered out a joint position on defense issues.

How much Mitterrand as leader of the coalition would feel compelled to concede to the communists on defense remains an open question. He probably could easily withstand the communists' more extreme demands--for example, phasing out the French nuclear forces or withdrawing from the Atlantic Alliance. Concessions of a lesser nature, however, would probably depend to a large extent on the percentage of Mitterrand's total vote supplied by the Communist Party.

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Although Mitterrand has placed strong emphasis on his intention--if elected--to continue present defense and military policies, he has advocated some changes. He is likely to join the Geneva disarmament talks, become more active at CSCE, and enter the MBFR forum.

Mitterrand, nevertheless, has stated that France belongs to the Western world, that it is part of the Atlantic Alliance, and that his government would continue development of the French nuclear forces. He has also said that France should not leave the Atlantic Alliance unless a better alternative was available. Such an alternative, according to Mitterrand, would require greater unification of Western Europe than is currently the case and the creation of something on the order of an all-European collective security pact.

By promising no major changes in the near term, Mitterrand may be trying to satisfy voters in the center and the less radical voters on the left. His ambiguous references to long-term alternatives may be an attempt to mollify the communist and more leftist elements of his coalition.

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\*TURKEY: The four-month-old coalition government suffered a serious setback yesterday when parliament, by a vote of 221 to 214, rejected its plan to grant amnesty to political offenders. Prime Minister Ecevit reportedly called a special cabinet meeting to discuss the situation after 20 members of one of the coalition parties broke ranks and voted with the opposition.

The defeat has fed speculation that the government might resign, although the vote on the amnesty plan did not amount to a vote of confidence. Ecevit could choose to interpret it as such and offer his resignation or, alternatively, he could call for a vote of confidence. [REDACTED]

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\*Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

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FOR THE RECORD

Denmark: The Danish Folketing recessed early this morning after rejecting a motion calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Hartling. A final vote on Hartling's controversial tax measures has been postponed until later today. Opposition parties failed in an attempt to force an immediate vote on the tax measures after the Prime Minister's attempts to garner support for the measures appeared still a few votes short of a majority.

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## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on May 7, 1974 approved the following national intelligence estimate:

NIE 11/12-73 "Soviet and East European  
Attitudes Toward MBFR"

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